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Inferring Capabilities of Intelligent Agents
from their External Traits
Bart P. Knijnenburg
University of California, Irvine
bart.k@uci.edu
ABSTRACT

We investigate the usability of human-like agent-based
interfaces. In an experiment we manipulate the capabilities and the “human-likeness” of a travel advisory agent.
We show that users of the more human-like agent form an
anthropomorphic use image of the system: they act as if
the system is human, and try to exploit typical human-like
capabilities. Unfortunately, this severely reduces the usability of the agent that looks human but lacks human-like
capabilities (overestimation effect). We also show that the
use image users form of agent-based systems is inherently
integrated (as opposed to the compositional use image
they form of conventional GUIs): cues provided by the
system do not instill user responses in a one-to-one
manner, but are instead integrated into a single use image.
Consequently, users try to exploit capabilities that were
not signaled by the system to begin with, thereby further
exacerbating the overestimation effect.
Keywords

Agent-based interaction, anthropomorphism, usability,
feedforward and feedback, use image.
INTRODUCTION

Agent-based interaction, in which the user interacts with a
virtual entity using natural language, has been a topic of
HCI research for several decades (Qui and Benbasat
2009; Walker et al. 1994; Quintanar et al. 1987; Nickerson 1976), and has gained renewed attention with the rise
of smartphone agents like Siri, Cortana and Google Now.
Because agent-based interaction is finer grained and
richer than interaction with conventional Graphical User
Interfaces (GUIs), it should better suit the increasingly
complex tasks we perform with computers (Laurel 1990).
People also find agent-based interaction more enjoyable
and more natural (Kang et al. 2012; Hess et al. 2005). At
the same time, though, some agents remind us of
“Clippy”: they seem unable to live up to their promises
(Nowak 2006; Dehn and van Mulken 2000). In this paper
we address the usability of agent-based interaction, and
identify a cognitive principle that makes agent-based
interaction different from traditional GUIs.
RELATED WORK AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT

To explain why some systems are more usable than
others, Norman (1986) argues that there are two gulfs
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between the user and the system: the gulf of execution
(the user has to discover how to manipulate the system to
accomplish a task) and the gulf of evaluation (the user has
to interpret whether output of the system is in line with
their goal). Users bridge these gulfs by forming a “use
image”, a mental representation of the way the system
works that helps them to infer which interface actions
fulfill their goal, and what the output of the system means.
According to Norman, the formation of an adequate use
image is greatly facilitated by providing appropriate
feedback (e.g. responses to actions) and feedforward (e.g.
labels on buttons).
The Layered Protocol Theory (LPT) operationalizes
Norman’s use image theory (Taylor 1988). It decomposes
user-system interaction into a set of layers, each breaking
users’ intentions down into smaller components.
Brinkman (2003) argues that this compositional character
is reflected in the users’ use image: the compositional use
image is the sum of the use images of its widgets (e.g.
levers, buttons, text fields, scrollbars).
Agent-Based Use Images

Many usability researchers and designers have assumed
the compositionality of the use image. Most usability
evaluation techniques evaluate the different parts of an
interface separately; the effectiveness of these techniques
thus depends on the legitimacy of the compositional use
image. Compositionality seems to hold for “real life”
interfaces (e.g., doors, phones) as well as conventional
GUIs. However, agent-based interfaces typically lack the
common levers, buttons, text fields and scrollbars. So
how do users form a use image of agent-based interfaces?
Cook and Salvendy (1989) note that users infer the use
image of an agent-based system from the way it “looks”
and “talks” (feedforward) and the apparent intelligence of
its responses (feedback), just like they would do when
interacting with other human beings. In fact, Laurel
(1990) argues that users attribute common human
intelligence to systems that provide human-like
appearance and capability cues. Indeed, studies show that
users of systems with a cartoon character that “talks” in
full sentences and personifies itself believe that it shows
some form of human intelligence, while users do not
show similar beliefs when using a system without such a
cartoon character that talks “computerese” (De Laere et
al. 1998; Quintanar et al. 1987). We thus argue that:

Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Workshop on HCI Research in MIS, Auckland, New Zealand, December 14, 2014
1

Knijnenburg et al.

The more human-like the system looks (appearance cues)
and the more capabilities it displays (capability cues), the
more intelligent users believe the system to be.
Note that the actual capabilities of the system might not
necessarily co-occur with capability cues; the system
might exhibit specific linguistic capabilities (e.g. using
the word “here” to refer to the current location) without
actually being able to understand them in the user dialog
(e.g. it may not be able to infer the current location when
the user uses the word “here”). In effect, cues of humanlike appearance and capabilities can underplay or overplay the agent’s actual capabilities.
What psychological mechanisms could underlie the use
image of believed intelligence? Thompson (1980) found
that users of a natural language-based system showed a
tendency to anthropomorphize the behavior of the system,
and this tendency also increases with personalization,
conversational tone, affective responses and diversified
wording (Quintanar et al. 1987; De Laere et al. 1998). Not
only agents are subject to anthropomorphism: users of any
computer system occasionally engage in negative
anthropomorphism (e.g. shouting; Chin, et al. 2005), and
adhere to social principles (e.g. politeness effect; Reeves
and Nass, 1996). Bradshaw (1997) argues that when a
system’s behavior is too complex to understand, users are
inclined to take the “intentional stance” (Dennett 1987):
they attribute intentional behavior to systems as a
convenient shortcut towards explaining complicated
behavioral patterns (i.e. the system “wants me to do X”,
or “doesn’t like it when I do Y”). This then also leads
them to adhere to human social principles. The intentional
stance holds for any system, but agents instill stronger
anthropomorphic reactions (Nowak 2006). Therefore:
In agent-based systems, the intentional stance is at the
heart of the use image construction. The use image is an
anthropomorphic construct, instilled by human-like cues.
As the use image is a mental construct, one cannot
observe directly whether or not it is anthropomorphic.
However, reactions to the use image can provide evidence
of its nature: if the use image is anthropomorphic, users
will interact with the agent in a way that is in accordance
with human-human interaction. Examples of “Human-like
responses” are the use of long and grammatically correct
sentences. Indeed existing research has found that the use
of a human-like avatar and personalized feedback
(human-like cues that may lead to an anthropomorphic
use image) leads users to be more verbose in their
responses (Brennan 1991; Rosé and Torrey 2005; Walker
et al. 1994; Richards and Underwood 1984). In sum:
Since the use image of an agent is anthropomorphic,
users will act in a more human-like way towards a system
they believe to be more intelligent.
Moreover, if the system looks and behaves human, then
users will believe it has typical human capabilities, and
will try to exploit these capabilities. An important
category of human capabilities is the linguistic capability
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of implicit reference to the context of the conversation
(Levinson 1983; Halliday and Hasan 1976). Computers
are notoriously bad at understanding such references
(Winograd 1972; Dey 2001; Scheutz et al. 2011), but
users may believe that human-like systems, like human
beings, can resolve them. Specifically, they may believe
that agents can understand references to a mentioned
location, (e.g. “here”, “there”), time (e.g. “now”, “then”),
or object (“that trip”, “that ticket”). In sum, we argue that:
Users will assume that systems they believe to be more
intelligent have more advanced linguistic capabilities,
and they will try to exploit these capabilities.
An Integrated Use Image?

If agent-based interfaces were like traditional GUIs, their
use image would be compositional. There would be a oneto-one mapping where each cue would instill its own use
image and induce a corresponding response. Brennan
(1991) found support for such a one-to-one mapping in
both human-human and natural language-based humancomputer interaction. Participants in her experiments
showed syntactic entrainment; a direct reflection of the
conversation partner’s responses. According to these
findings, one could evoke a certain behavior in the users’
response by expressing the same behavior in the agent.
However, the intentional stance (Dennett 1987) should
allow users to create an integrated use image based on the
behavior of the system as a whole. If the system is
sufficiently human-like, it will be attributed intentional
behavior, and this attribution is based on the “humanlikeness” of the agent as a whole, not on a specific part of
its behavior. The fact that the “system” is “human”
provides them instantaneously and effortlessly with a
detailed use image of what it can do and how to interact
with it: if the system looks and behaves human, the use
image simply dictates that the system can and cannot do
whatever humans can and cannot do. In the words of
Laurel (1990, pp. 358-359): “[An agent] makes optimal
use of our ability to make accurate inferences about how a
character is likely to think, decide and act on the basis of
its external traits. This marvelous cognitive shorthand is
what makes plays and movies work […] With interface
agents, users can employ the same shorthand—with the
same likelihood of success—to predict, and therefore
control the actions of their agents.” However, if users
integrate the system cues into a single use image of
believed intelligence, this creates a much less straightforward relation between system cues and user responses:
All cues about the intelligence of the system will be
integrated into a single use image and instill a series of
possibly unrelated responses.
The integrated use image has both positive and negative
consequences for agents’ usability (Dehn and van Mulken
2000; Qiu and Benbasat, 2009). The integrated use image
makes agents especially suitable for complex tasks.
Conventional GUIs require additional widgets for each
additional function, which makes it impossible to create a
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really usable GUI for a complex system. Agent-based
interfaces, on the other hand, have an integrated use
image that instantly provide users with a heuristic to
determine what they can and cannot do, and how to
access the functionality. However, if the agent looks more
capable than it actually is, users will overestimate the
system’s capabilities, which will result in confusion and
reduced usability (Brennan 1991; Forlizzi et al. 2007;
Walker et al. 1994).
Good usability arises when the user tries to use only those
capabilities that the system actually provides. This means
that the use image has to match the actual system
capabilities (Norman 1986). If the use image of an agent
were compositional, it would be fairly easy to “manage”
this use image: the system could simply provide a
matching cue for each capability. However, an integrated
use image is much harder to manage, because there is
more than just a one-to-one relation between cues and
responses. In effect, even human-like appearance cues
may instill capability-exploiting responses: merely
“looking human” may be enough to make users believe
that the system has certain human-like capabilities (even
if these are not actually present).
In sum, the presumed integrated use image is responsible
for both the greatest advantage but at the same time the
most significant drawback of agent-based interaction: due
to our natural tendency to use anthropomorphism, it is
very easy to instantly create a complex, integrated use
image from which users can effortlessly infer a myriad of
complex functions to perform with the system, along with
possible ways to exploit them. However, since these
functions are not directly coupled to a specific underlying
cue, an overestimation effect can easily occur, and it will
be rather difficult to tweak this use image such that it
perfectly matches the actual system capabilities.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

The goal of our experiment is to empirically demonstrate
that the use image of agents is more likely to be integrated
rather than compositional. We also want to test if an
agent-based use image indeed instills human-like and
capability-exploiting responses. Finally, we want to
evaluate the effect of these responses on the usability of
the interaction (i.e. the overestimation effect).
In our experiment, we independently vary the system’s
feedforward cues and its actual capabilities. There are
three levels of cues: “computer-like cues” (agent looks
and talks like a computer), “human-like appearance cues”
(agent looks and talks like a human being), and “humanlike appearance and capability cues” (agent additionally
uses references in its sentences, which signals its
capability to understand such references). There are two
levels of capabilities: “low capabilities” (system can only
process simple, complete requests) and “high capabilities”
(system can process complex requests with implicit
references, like a human being). We argue that a system
with high capabilities should generally be easier to use:
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H1. Usability in the “high capabilities” condition should
be higher than in the “low capabilities” condition.
Within the low capabilities conditions overestimation can
occur, when the system appears human-like and displays
human-like cues:
H2. Within the “low capabilities” conditions, the “humanlike appearance cues” and “human-like appearance
and capability cues” conditions should lead to lower
usability than the “computer-like cues” condition.
Moreover, the existence of an anthropomorphic use image
predicts the presence of more human-like and capabilityexploiting responses when human-like cues are provided:
H3. Within the “high capabilities” conditions, the
“human-like appearance cues” and the “human-like
appearance and capability cues” conditions lead to
more human-like and capability-exploiting responses
than in the “computer-like cues” condition.
Finally, if the agent-based use image is compositional,
appearance cues cannot evoke capability-exploiting
responses, and users will try to exploit human-like
capabilities in the “human-like appearance and capability
cues” condition only. But if the use image is integrated, a
human-like appearance cue given by the agent can evoke
capability-exploiting responses, and users will try to
exploit human-like capabilities in both the “human-like
appearance cues” and the “human-like appearance and
capability cues” conditions. In other words, if the
following hypothesis is upheld, this would rule out the
compositional use image would predict, and provide
evidence for an integrated use image:
H4. Within the “high capabilities” conditions, users
exhibit more capability-exploiting responses than in
the “computer-like cues” condition even when the
system does not give human-like capability cues (i.e.
even in the “human-like appearance cues” condition).
Experimental setup

For the experiment we created an online agent that gives
travel info for the Dutch Railways. 92 university students
from all over The Netherlands (35 male; age M=21.8,
SD=3.55) took part in the experiment. For additional
power to test H3 and H4, 59 participants were randomly
assigned to the “high capabilities” conditions and only 33
to the “low capabilities” conditions. Users performed four
predefined tasks (e.g. “You are in Eindhoven and you
want to go to Tilburg. Find out if you have to switch
trains anywhere.”) by typing requests to the system. A
Wizard of Oz technique was used to provide the answers:
users were ostensibly interacting with a real system, but
were actually talking to the experimenter, who read inputs
and provided responses using a strict protocol.
We measured personal references, number words per request, and grammatical correctness of requests as humanlike responses. These behaviors typically occur in
interaction between two humans, but not when interacting
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(β = 6.47, p < .005) indeed increased with cue level. This
is evidence for the existence of an anthropomorphic use
image, as several human-like responses were significantly
higher when the system had more human-like cues.

with a computer (Rosé et al. 2005; Shechtman and
Horowitz 2003; Brennan, 1991). We measured explicit
and implicit references to times, places, and earlier
questions, and asking multiple questions at once, as
capability-exploiting responses. These behaviors occur
when a participant assume that the agent understands the
context of the conversation, like a human would. Finally,
we measured usability by the number of requests and
amount of time participants needed per task (efficiency),
the difference in time per task between the first and last
task (learnability), the “overall reactions to the software”
section of the QUIS (Chin et al. 1988), and occurrences of
users discontinuing the experiment (effectiveness).

H3 also suggests that the occurrence of capabilityexploiting responses in the “high capabilities” conditions
increases with cue level. A sum measure of the five
capability-exploiting responses (see Measures) was taken
for each task. Figure 1 (rightmost panel) shows that the
number of capability-exploiting responses in the humanlike conditions is significantly higher than in the
computer-like cues condition (β = 0.288, p < .05). These
results provide further evidence for the existence of an
anthropomorphic use image, as the total number of
capability-exploiting responses was significantly higher
when the system had more human-like cues.

RESULTS

We first confirm that the system with high capabilities is
actually more usable than the system with low capabilities
(H1) Users needed fewer requests per task (2.38 vs. 3.32,
p < .005), and were more satisfied (31.47 vs. 24.07,
p < .001) in the high-capabilities than the low-capabilities
conditions, indicating that the former was indeed more
usable than the latter. The average time needed to perform
the tasks was actually higher in the high capabilities
conditions than the low capabilities conditions (211s vs.
185s, not significant).

Finally, if users have an integrated use image (H4), they
should show capability-exploiting responses even when
the system does not give human-like capability cues (i.e.
when it gives human-like appearance cues only). Figure 1
(bottom panel) shows that capability-exploiting responses
are indeed higher in the “human-like appearance cues”
systems than in the “computer-like cues” condition (a
planned contrast between “computer-like cues” and the
other two conditions is significant at p < .05). This rules
out a compositional use image, since it would require that
only the capability cues condition can induce capabilityexploiting responses. In fact, capability-exploiting
responses in the “human-like appearance cues” condition
are not significantly different from the “human-like
appearance and capability cues” condition.

H2 suggests that for low capability systems, users in the
“human-like appearance cues” and “human-like appearance and capability cues” conditions overestimate the
capabilities of the system, resulting in lower usability than
the “computer-like cues” condition. Strong evidence for
overestimation was found in terms of system effectiveness: 5 of the 23 participants interacting with a system
with low capabilities but human-like cues (and none for
computer-like cues) prematurely quit the experiment.
Additional evidence of overestimation was found in terms
of learnability. Within the low-capabilities condition,
users of the computer-like interface showed a higher time
decrease from task 1 to task 4 (–108.56s) than users of the
human-like systems (–40.12s and –25.89s, p < .05).

CONCLUSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

Siri, Cortana and Google Now show that agents definitely
have potential. Still, managers have to be very careful
introducing a human-like agent in their systems. Humanlike agents are a metaphor; its cues are effortlessly integrated into a single use image. This use image, though,
instills a set of responses that do not necessarily need to
be directly related to the provided cues. Specifically,
capability-exploiting responses can be induced even by
appearance cues alone. If the agent looks “too human”,
users might overestimate its capabilities, and suffer from
bad usability. For usable agent-based interaction, each cue
must thus be delicately tuned to instill the right beliefs.

H3 suggests that human-like responses in the “high
capabilities” conditions increase from computer-like cues,
to human-like appearance cues, to human-like appearance
and capability cues. Figure 1 shows that first-person
references (β = 1.16, p < .001), words per chat request
(β = 2.50, p < .005) and grammatical correctness
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Figure 1. Pps use more human-like and capability-exploiting responses towards systems with human-like cues (HLC) and human-like and
capability-exploiting cues (HLCEC), than towards systems with computer-like cues (CLC).
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Such fine-tuning projects call for artificial intelligence
specialists that can develop smarter systems, social
psychologists that know self-presentation techniques,
designers that can build these techniques into their characters, and usability researchers that can test the correctness
of the formed use image with users. Arguably, only such a
multidisciplinary team can bring about a successful
paradigm shift from GUIs to agent-based interfaces.
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